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Financing Channels and the Performance of Chinese Small
and Medium High-Tech Enterprises

Yanwei Chen*
Syracuse University
& Shanghai Stock Exchange
and
Liang Lei
NEUWA Corp.

China’s astonishing economic growth in recent years has attracted many research
interests. It is well documented that small and medium-sized enterprises have become a
major driving force making China’s economic miracle. Financing is critical to small business;
however, there are limited studies on financing sources for Chinese small business and how
different financing sources affect the performance of small business. This paper investigates
the influence of different financing channels on the performance of Chinese small and
medium sized high-tech enterprises. We find that small firms in China rely heavily on
individual financing due to the difficulty in obtaining external financing. Our results show
that individual financing is negatively related to the firm performance measured by operating
revenues. In contrast, firms with foreign financing have better performance. However, one
should be cautious to interpret the influence of foreign financing on firm performance. Our
results also indicate that foreign financing is positively related to the probability of a firm
incurring loss. On one hand, foreign ownership brings in advanced management skills and
better corporate governance and thus produces high operating revenues. However, on the
other hand, foreign ownership results in high operating costs due to cultural difference and
adjustments to China’s business environment. When costs associated with foreign financing
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outweigh the benefits it bring in, the firm with foreign financing will have higher probability
to incur loss compared to firms financed by other channels.
1. Introduction
The lack of detailed data on small businesses as well as the funds they raise in private
equity and debt markets is likely a major reason why until very recently small business
finance has been one of the most under-studied areas in finance (Berger and Udell 1998).
Studies on financing sources for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) have important
economic and policy implications given the large number of SMEs and their contribution to
job creation and their impacts on economic growth.^ However, unlike listed companies who
can raise capital from public sources, SMEs are usually not publicly traded therefore are
difficult to raise funds firom public sources. Since the funding sources for SMEs are limited,
it is important to study the effects of different financing channels on firm performance and
how to allocate scarce resources in a more efficient way. However, the existent literature on
financing sources for small and medium-size enterprises is short and mainly focuses on SMEs
in the developed countries. (Craig et al, 2007; Berger and Udell, 1998; Cole, 2008).
The lack of studies on SMEs is largely due to the scarce of data. Unlike listed
companies that disclose financial data regularly to the public, small enterprises are generally
not publicly traded therefore are not required to disclose financial information to the public.
As a result, most studies on SMEs use data from proprietary sources, for example, data
collected on lending by financial institutions like commercial banks and credit unions. There
are also few surveys conducted on small businesses, but these data were not widely accessible
to researchers.
In their seminal paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show a relation between external
financing and firm performance. Using a large sample of countries over the 1980’s, they find
that the financial development and thus the availability of external financing have a
significant supportive influence on the rate of economic growth. Similarly, Craig et al (2007)
find a positive and significant relationship between the relative levels of U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) guaranteed lending in a local market and the future per capita income
growth. In a Recent study, Beck et al (2008) use a firm-level survey data to investigate how
financial and institutional developments affect financing of large and small companies. Their
findings suggest that small companies and companies in countries with poor institutions use
less external financing. The lack of access to external finance for small firms is primarily due
to the market imperfection and information asymmetry.
Stimulated by China’s astonishing economic growth in recent years, many researchers
showed great interests in studies on financing sources of China’s enterprises. Using a sample
of Chinese state-owned enterprises covering from 1980 to 1994, Cull and Xu (2003) find that
bank finance is positively associated to firm profitability. However, this association between
bank finance and profitability weakened in the 1990s. They also find that direct government
transfers were not significantly associated with profitability.

^In China, for example, there are less than 2,000 firms that issue publicly traded stocks (As o f March 2009, there
are 864 companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 738 companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
Total number o f listed companies in mainland China is 1,602.), yet there are approximately 7 million business
entities in China. According to Mckinsey&Company (2006), privately held firms are vital to the Chinese
economy, producing as much as 75% o f all job opportunities and account for 55% o f GDP.
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Although Cull and Xu (2003) did not find statistically significant association between
government transfers and profitability of state-owned enterprises, other researchers show that
government supports indeed play a significant role in promoting the development of small
business in China. For instance, Li and Matlay (2006) point out that support from local
government is crucial to the development of Chinese small business. Wu (2002) shows a
series of entrepreneurial activities initiated by Shanghai municipal government.
Noticing the large percentage of legal person ownership in China’s public companies,
Delios and Wu (2005) investigate the relationship between the concentration of legal person
shareholding and firm performance for China’s listed companies. They use Tobin’s Q as the
measure of firm performance. Their finding shows that legal person ownership and firm
performance have a complicated relation. When the level of legal person ownership is high,
legal person ownership has a positive relationship with firm performance; however, this
relationship does not hold when the legal person ownership is low. In another study, Wei et al.
(2005) find a significant negative relation between firms’ Tobin’s Q and the ownership stake
of the government and legal institutions (non-tradable shares), while foreign ownership is
significantly positively related to Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Bai et al. (2004) show that issuing
shares to foreign investors is associated with higher market valuation and better firm
performance.
More recently, Li et al. (2007) use a firm-level dataset to investigate the role of
ownership and institutional development in debt financing of private firms in China. Their
findings show that firms with high foreign ownership are less leveraged compared to their
Chinese-owned counterparts. They also find that state owned banks have high tendencies to
grant long-term loans only to state-owned firms.
Most of above studies focus on either listed or large companies; therefore, even the
small companies in their samples are relatively large. Given the important role that SMEs
play in the economic growth and job creation, better understanding of the financing sources
for SMEs and how they affect firms’ performance have important policy and resource
implications.
In this study, we use a firm-level dataset to investigate the effects of financing sources
on the performance of small and medium-sized firms in a metropolitan area in China. In order
to promote the development of high-tech companies, the local government enacted a series of
tax breaks and tax reduction policies to support the growth of high-tech companies in the
region. Qualified high-tech companies are certified by the local government to be exempted
from certain taxes for a period of 2 years. The dataset includes all high-tech companies
applied for tax exemption programs initiated by the metropolitan government in 2004 and
2005. One of the strengths of this dataset is that it covers primarily small and medium sized
firms with detailed financing source information. The dataset also includes registered capital,
operating revenues, net income and other related financial information.
Our results show that SMEs in China finance a large portion of their capital using
individual sources. However, our regression model indicates that individual financing is
negatively related to the operating revenue, meaning that firms primarily financed by
individuals will result in lower economic outputs, all else equal. The large portion of
individual financing indicates the market inefficiency and SMEs have to rely heavily on
personal or individual relationship to obtain funding. By dividing our dataset into smaller and
larger sub-samples, we find that smaller firms finance their capital significantly more from
individuals but less from government compared to that of larger firms despite the fact that
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smaller firms need more help from government to obtain funding due to information
asymmetry in the capital market. These findings unveil the small firms’ limited access to the
external financing sources in China, and the alternative financing source for them is primarily
from individuals.
This study also shows a positive relationship between the foreign financing and
operating revenues. SMEs with foreign ownership are more likely to have higher operating
revenues, all else equal. However, we need to be cautious to interpret this result. The logit
model indicates that foreign financing is positively related to the probability of loss
occurrence, meaning that the probability of getting a loss is high for SMEs with foreign
ownership. One possible explanation for these seemingly contradictory results is that
although foreign ownership brings in capital, technology, modem management and better
corporate government and thus produces higher revenues, at the same time, SMEs with large
portion of foreign ownership may incur significantly higher operating costs associated with
cultural difference and business environment adjustments. If the costs associated with foreign
financing outweigh the benefits that it might bring in, firms rely on foreign financing might
have higher probability to incur loss compared to firms primarily financed by other channels.
However, we only have one flrm-year data, it is impossible for us to investigate the
performance of SMEs in the long run. It will be more informative if we had time series data to
test the profitability of SMEs in the long run.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we use a new dataset to
investigate the effects of different financing sources on the performance of Chinese SMEs.
Second, to our best knowledge, this is the first study to show that although foreign ownership
will bring in higher economic outputs, SMEs rely on foreign financing are more likely to
incur loss due to higher operating expenses associated with culture difference and business
environment adjustments. Third, this paper provides new empirical evidence to the existent
literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the data and
descriptive statistics. Section 3 states our hypotheses and model specification. Section 4
presents results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a unique dataset to analyze SMEs’ financing sources and their impacts on firm
performance in a metropolitan area in China. SMEs in China are defined as enterprises with
between 8 and 2,000 employees, less than US $50 million assets, and less than US $37
million sales (Mckinsey&Company, 2006). The development of SMEs has significant impact
on the socio-economic transition in China. It is well documented that small and medium
sized enterprises have become a major driving force in China’s astonishing economic growth,
and turned China from a relatively closed and stagnating economy into a sustainable growth
and dynamic industrial expansion (Li and Matlay, 2006; Li, 2002; Byrd and Lin, 1990; Oi,
1992).
In order to sustain its astonishing GDP growth and improve the quality of its economy,
the Chinese government has implemented a set of schemes to support the development of
SMEs. Among such efforts, the metropolitan government in our study enacted a series of tax
relief and tax reduction policies to support the growth of high- and new- tech companies in
the region. Tax relief is a frequently used incentive to encourage investments in certain
economic development zones and high-tech development districts in China. Wu et al (2007)
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show that tax incentives play a major role in attracting business and influencing business
investment decisions.
To apply for the tax exemption programs, high-tech companies are required to provide
certain financial information such as the financing sources, registered capitals, operating
revenues and net incomes to the local authorities. Once approved, these high-tech companies
are certified by the local government to be exempted from certain taxes for a period of 2
years. Our dataset includes all high-tech companies certified by the local government for the
tax exemption purpose in 2004 and 2005. Using this dataset, we investigate the financing
sources of Chinese high-tech SMEs and how different financing sources affect SMEs’
performance. To be included in this study, companies must have information on financing
sources. This results in 1519 companies in the dataset. However, some of these companies do
not have necessary financial data such as registered capital, operating revenues, and net
income. After removing companies without necessary financial information, the final dataset
contains 679 companies. There are 325 companies in 2004, accounting for 47.86% of total
firms, and there are 354 companies in 2005, representing 52.14% of total firms. Since the tax
relief certification is valid for 2 years, the companies in 2004 and 2005 are not recurring. In
our study, we do not have information on the amount of debt or total assets. However, we
know the amount of capital financed from a particular source.
Table 1 gives the size of firms in the dataset measured by registered capital and
operating revenues^. The mean (median) size of the firm is $1,941,632 ($290,206) measured
by the registered capital. If measured by operating revenues, the mean (median) size of the
firm is $7,453,386 ($614,268). We can see from Table 1 that the majority of firms in the
dataset are small and medium-size firms.
The companies in the dataset represent 11 high-tech industries. Table 2 summarizes
the companies’ industry distribution. The most frequent industry is Electronic and
Information Technology industry, which includes 301 companies, accounting for 44.59% of
total observations, followed by the New Materials and Applied Technology industry, which
includes 95 companies, representing 14.07% of total observations in the dataset.
Financing sources of Chinese SMEs could be broadly categorized into six major
groups: 1) financing from government; 2) financing from collective sources; 3) financing
from legal person^; 4) financing from individuals; 5) financing from Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan (HMT)"^ investors; and 6 ) financing from foreign investors. Among these financing
sources, financing from individuals is usually considered as informal financing (Ayyagari
2008). Table 3 gives sunmiaries on companies’ financing sources.
The number of companies that received fiinding from individuals is 440, the highest
number among all the financing sources, accounting for 51% of total observations. This
indicates that the majority of Chinese SMEs receive funding from individual sources. The
second most frequent financing source is from the legal person. 235 firms received funding
from legal person, accounting for 27.3% of total observations. The number (percentage) of

^We do not have information on total assets, a frequently used measurement for firm size in the hterature. We
have detailed information on the registered capital and the sources o f capital.
^As Ayyagari et al (2008) pointed out that legal Person shareholders are unique to China and are analogous to
institutional shareholders in western economies except that they tend to have strong state linkages and are not
widely held as in western economies.
Some literature refers Hongkong, Macao, Taiwan as ethnic Chinese (i.e. Allen et al 2007).
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companies receive financing from foreign investors, government, collective sources and
ethnic Chinese investors is 66 (7.7%), 56 (6.5%), 37 (4.3%) and 28 (3.2%) respectively.
In terms of dollar amount, the largest financing source is fi:om legal person,
accounting for 38.4% of total financing amount. Foreign investment consists of 24.4% of total
financing sources. The average financing size is $4,873,400 for foreign investments, the
highest among all average financing sizes. The second highest average financing source is
firom government, which is $2,754,200. The average financing size from legal person is
$2,154,500 and average funding from HMT is $1,408,900. The average financing from
individuals and collective sources are among the lowest ones, namely, $633,700 and $484,300
respectively. For comparison purpose. Table 3 also gives the average financing amount for all
financing sources, which is $1,529,400. Although the majority of Chinese SMEs receive
frinding from individual sources, the average size of individual financing is small compared to
that of other financing sources.
We can further divide all firms into two groups by the size of operating revenue. One
group has all the firms with operating revenue less than the median operating revenue, and we
call this group the smaller size group. Another group has all the firms with operating revenues
greater than or equal to the median operating revenues, and we call this group the larger size
group. Table 4 gives the summary of financing sources for smaller and larger size firms. The
average (median) operating revenue for smaller firm is $206,385 ($169,891), and the average
(median) operating revenue for larger firm is $14,679,069 ($2,497,134).
It is quite interesting to observe that for the smaller size group, among all financing
channels, the financing from individual source is dominant, accounting for 49.5% of total
financing amounts. However, for larger size group, the percentage of individual financing
accounts for only 17.27% of total financing amounts. This interesting observation indicates
that the main financing channel for smaller firms is individual financing. This empirical
finding confirms Beck et al. (2008)’s conclusion that small companies use less external
financing. Another interesting observation is that the financing from foreign investors for
larger firms is significantly higher than that for smaller firms. The percentage of foreign
financing to total financing for larger firm is 27.12%; however this number is only 4.5% for
smaller firms. The percentage of government financing to total financing for larger firms is
12.28%, which is also much larger than that of smaller firms. For smaller firms, that number
is only 7.48%. For comparison purpose, Table 4 also gives the average amount of various
financing channels for all firms. Above observations clearly show that smaller firms mainly
obtain financing from informal channel such as individuals. It is difficult for smaller firms to
obtain financing from external channels. Since SMEs are the potential driving force for
economic growth in China, and supports from external financing are crucial to the healthy
development of small business (Li and Matlay 2006; Wu 2002), Chinese government should
promote supporting policies to facilitate small firms to obtain extemal financing. These
supporting policies include increasing lending to SMEs and improving market efficiency.
Studies have shown that guaranteed lending from government is positively associated to the
future income growth (Craig 2007).
There are four different financing types in our sample: 1) cash; 2) real assets; 3) land
possession rights; and 4) technology transfer. Table 5 summarizes the amounts and the
percentage of each financing type. Table 5 shows that cash is the primary financing
instrument. Cash financing consists of 81.54% of total financing amounts, followed by real
assets investment, which accounts for 12.61% of total financing amounts. Technology
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transfer and Land possession right account for 4.24% and 1.6% of total financing amounts,
respectively. In terms of number (percentage) of firms supported by each financing type, 596
(97.23%) firms receive cash financing, and 123 (20.07%) firms receive financing from real
assets investment. Only a small number (percentage) of firms receive financing by means of
technology transfer and land possession right, namely, 48 (7.83%) and 8 (1.31%) respectively.
3. Hypothesis Development and Model Specification
Since the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of informal financial system are
not properly equipped, it is difficult for informal financial system to scale up and meet the
needs of the higher end of the market (Ayyagari et al 2008). Ayyagari et al (2008) show that
firms which rely on informal financing have lower profit reinvestment rates and do not grow
faster or have higher productivity growth than firms that are bank financed. As a typical form
of informal financing, individual financing is usually associated with poor professional
management and weak corporate governance. As a result, companies rely on individual
financing are difficult to achieve economy of scale and faster growth. Operating revenue is a
natural measure of firm’s economic output and is frequently used in the literature as a
measure of firm performance. Based on above argument, we hypothesize that the individual
financing source is negatively associated with the operating revenue.
In contrast, foreign ownership brings in not only capital and technology but also
modem management and better governance practices. Effective management and government
are essential for achieving economic growth and business development. Moreover, foreignowned firms are subject to lower corporate tax rates than their domestically-owned
counterparts^. Therefore, we hypothesize that foreign financing source is positively related to
the operating revenue.
Based on the above arguments, our first hypothesis is stated as following:

HI a: Individual financing is negatively related to the operating revenue.
Companies rely on individual financing will have lower revenues,
ceteris paribus.
Hlb: Foreign financing is positively related to the operating revenue.
Foreign ownership will produce higher operating revenues, ceteris
paribus.
The following OLS model is employed to evaluate above Hypotheses:
Log(RQ venue) = J3q -\- P^Log{Capital) + p^Dumgov + p^Dumper + P^Dummd

+ p^Dumhmt + P^Dumfor + p^Dum^A + e

(1)

Where log(Revenue) is the natural logarithm of operating revenues in the fiscal year;
log(Capital) is the natural logarithm of registered capital; Dumgov is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm receives financing from government; Dumper is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm receives financing from legal persons; Dumind is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm receives financing from individuals; Dumhmt is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm receives financing from Hongkong, Macao or Taiwan; Dumfor is a
^A foreign investment company’s profits are subject to Foreign Enterprise Income Tax. It can generally be
reduced from 33% to 24% (or further to 15%), when the company operates in coastal cities etc.
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dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm receives financing firom foreign investors; and
Dum04 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is in 2004.
While we hypothesize that foreign financing is positively related to the operating
revenue, we want to further investigate the influence of different financing sources on the
firm’s profitability. Since we do not have information on common profitability measurements
used in the literature such as return on assets and return on equity, in stead, we use the
likelihood of a firm making profit or incurring loss as our measure of firm profitability. As
noted earlier, foreign ownership could bring in advanced management skills and better
corporate governance. However, foreign ownership also needs to overcome cultural
differences and adjust to different business environments and legal settings. The costs of such
adjustments are not trivial, especially to relatively new foreign investments entering into
China’s market. The influence of unique Chinese culture and business environment on firm
behaviors is reported by many researchers. For example, Siu (2005) found that under the
influence of indigenous Chinese cultural values, SMEs are more likely to adopt a relationoriented marketing approach and place emphasis on building relations with media, rather than
advertising. Allen et al. (2005) point out that alternative financing channel based on
reputation and relationships is critical to support the growth of private sectors in China.
The firms included in our dataset are high- and new-technology firms. Therefore, most
firms in our dataset are relatively young, especially firms with foreign financing given the
nature of high-tech industry and China’s recent opening to foreign investments. Young firms
usually need a high amount of fixed investment to set up the operation. In addition, foreign
financing is usually associated with relatively large investments. As Table 3 illustrates, in
terms of average financing size, foreign investment is the highest among all financing
channels. Based on above discussion, we expect that the operating cost associated with
foreign financing is high as well. In another word, the operating expenses for firms with
foreign ownership will be higher.
On the one hand, high-tech firms with foreign investments will have potential high
operating revenues because of better management skills and corporate governance associated
with foreign ownership. On the other hand, most high-tech firms with financing fi*om foreign
investors are relatively young in our dataset, resulting in high operating expenses and high
costs to adjust to China’s cultural difference and unique business environment. Above
arguments give mixed signals to the direction of impact of foreign financing on the firm’s
profitability. Therefore, we state our second h)^othesis in the null form:
H2: Foreign financing has no relationship with the probability of firm having a
negative income. Firms with foreign financing do not have higher probability to incur loss or
make profit, ceteris paribus.
We use a logit model to evaluate this Hypothesis.
Loss = pQ+ p^Log(KQ venue) + Pj^ogiCapital) + P^Dumgov -I- p^Dumper

+ P^Du min d + P^Dumhmt + p^Dumfor + p^Dum^iA + £
Where loss is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm incurs loss (net income is
negative), and 0 otherwise. Other variables in the model are defined earlier. The model
calculates the probability that the firm experiences loss during the fiscal year.
Table 6 summarizes descriptive statistics on variables and Table 7 gives correlation
matrix.
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4. Results
The results from OLS model are given in Table 8 . The results support our Hypothesis
la and lb. Individual financing (Dumind) is negatively related to the operating revenue, and
this relationship is statistically significant at 95% level. This finding confirms results of
Ayyagari et al. (2008), which concludes that financing from informal sources such as
individuals, family members and friends is not associated with faster firm growth. In contrast,
Foreign financing (Dumfor) is positively associated with the operating revenue, and the
association is statistically significant at 95% level. Similar to previous findings (Wei et al.
2005, Bai et al. 2004), we find that firms with foreign ownership have better performance in
terms of overall economic outputs. The regression results show that government financing
and legal person financing are not significantly related to firm performance. The R square is
0.4, meaning that 40% dependent variables can be explained by independent variables.
As mentioned earlier, we also investigate how different funding sources affect a firm’s
profitability measured by the probability of loss occurrence. Table 9 presents the result from
the logit model.
From Table 9 we can see that the dummy variable representing foreign financing
(dumfor) is positively related to loss, and this relationship is statistically significant at 99 %
level. Firms that rely on foreign financing are more likely to incur negative income. It is
interesting to observe that the dummy variable for Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan financing
(dumhmt, i.e. ethnic Chinese) is negatively and significantly related to loss. This indicates
tiiat firms with ethnic Chinese financing are less likely to incur loss while operating in China.
This finding actually strengthens our Hypothesis 2. Similarly to foreign ownership, ethnic
Chinese ownership could bring in advanced management skills and better corporate
govemance; however, different fi*om foreign investors, ethnic Chinese investors have a closer
exposure to China’s business environment and better understanding of Chinese culture.
Therefore, the costs for ethnic Chinese investors to adjust to China’s business environment
are less compared to those for foreign investors. As a result, firms with HMT ownership will
be less likely to incur loss in China.
Another interesting observation is that dummy variable for 2004 (dum04) is positively
and significantly related to loss. Compared to firms in 2004, firms in 2005 are less likely to
incur loss. One possible explanation is that the general business environment for high-tech
industries in 2005 was better than that of previous year. Actually, there was a series of
supporting policies and tax reliefs enacted by the municipal government to enhance the
development of high-tech companies in the 2000s. We expect a gradually better business
environment for the SMEs in China.
Our results are not limited by the specification of financing sources. Instead of
dummy variables, we also tried to use the percentage of each financing source in terms of
total capital as explanatory variables, and we obtain qualitatively similar results. We also
separate the data set by years into 2004 and 2005 data, and we still obtain qualitatively similar
results. Our results are robust across different years.
5. Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper, we investigate how different financing sources affect high-tech firms’
performance in a metropolitan area in China. We find that individual financing is negatively
related to the operating revenue; that is, firms rely on individual financing will have less
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economic output, ceteris paribus. We also find that foreign financing is positively related to
the operating revenue, implying that firms with foreign financing will likely to have higher
economic output. However, due to the high costs associated with foreign ownership, the
operating expenses associated with foreign financing are likely to be higher as well. Those
expenses may be caused by such adjustments as to fusion into China’s social culture and
business environment. As a result, although foreign ownership could bring in advanced
management skills and better corporate governance and thus make higher revenues, the costs
associated with foreign financing are high as well. Our analyses show that firms with foreign
financing are more likely to experience operating loss, indicating that the costs associated
with adjustments to an unfamiliar business environment might outweigh the benefits brought
by foreign ownership.
Our analyses also show that for smaller and larger SMEs in China, the financing
channels are quite different. For smaller firms, financing source is primarily from individuals.
However, for larger size firms, financing sources are more diversified. The institutional
ownership such as ownerships by legal person, government and foreign investors are higher
for larger firms. Given the important role that external financing plays in the financial
market, it will be very helpful for the healthy development of Chinese SMEs if government
could facilitate them to obtain external financing.
We only have one firm-year data in this study. It will be very interesting to investigate
the time series behavior of those firms in our dataset. Further research can utilize time-series
data to investigate the impacts of financing sources on the performance of Chinese SMEs in
the long run.
In summary, our findings show that financing channels have significant impacts on the
performance of Chinese SMEs. The policy implication that we can draw from our findings is
that Chinese government should encourage foreign investments and at the same time to help
foreign investors better adjust to Chinese business environment and thus reduce their
operating costs.
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Table 1
Summary on Firm Sizes (in US$000)
Measurements
Registered
Capital
Operating
Revenue

Minimum

Qi

Mean

Median

Q3

Maximum

Std. Dev.

3.6

84.6

1,941.6

290.2

1,209.2

241,838

10,312.8

0.25

169.9

7,453.4

614.3

2,527.5

1,643,546

71,247.9

Table 2
Industry Distribution
Frequency

Percent (%)

Cumulative Frequency

Cumulative Percent (%)

1

301

44.59

301

44.59

2

95

14.07

396

58.67

3

37

5.48

433

64.15

4

75

11.11

508

75.26

5

78

11.56

586

86.81

6

18

2.67

604

89.48

7

41

6.07

645

95.56

8

5

0.74

650

96.3

9

3

0.44

653

96.74

10

1

0.15

654

96.89

Industry code

100
675
3.11
21
19
Note 1: Industry Code: 1: Electronic and Information Technology; 2: New Materials and Applied Technology; 3:
New Energy and Energy Saving Technology; 4: Advanced Manufactunng Technology; 5: Biological
Engineering and New Pharmaceutical Technology; 6: Modem Agricultural Technology; 7: Innovative
Environmental Conservation Technology; 8: Applied Nuclear Technology; 9: Aeronautic and Astronautic
Technology; 10: Oceanic Engineering and Technology; 19: Others
Note 2: There are four companies with missing industry information.
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Table 3
Summary of Financing Sources ($ amount in 000)

Percentage by
Amounts

# o f firms
supported
by the financing
source

% by#of
firms
supported

154,237.6

11.7%

56

6.5%

2,754.2

17,920

1.4%

37

4.3%

484.3

506,298.1

38.4%

235

27.3%

2,154.5

440

51%

633.7

28

3.2%

1,408.9

66

7.7%

4,873.4

Financing
Source

Financing
Amounts
(US$000)

Government
Collective
Legal Person
Individual
HMT
Foreign

21.2%

278,819.5

3%

39,448.1

24.4%

321,646.4

Average fmancing
Amounts
(US$000)

100%

1,529.4
862
100.00%
Total
1,318,369.8
Note: Some companies have multiple financing sources, for example, companies financed by both legal person
and individuals.

Table 4
Financing Sources for Smaller and Larger Firms
Government

Collective

Legal
Person

Individual

HMT

Foreign

sum

Smaller (%)

7.48%

1.40%

36.71%

49.50%

0.41%

4.50%

100.00%

($000)
Larger (%)

11,871.8
12.28%

2,218.3
1.35%

58,280.2
38.63%

78,572.2
17.27%

653
3.35%

7,150.3
27.12%

158,745.8
100.00%

($000)

142,365.8

15,701.8

448,017.9

200,247.4

38,794.5

314,496

1,159,623.4

11.70%

1.36%

38.40%

21.15%

2.99%

24.40%

100.00%

154,237.6

17,920

506,298.2

278,819.5

39,448.1

321,646.4

1,318,370

All firms (%)
($000)

Table 5
Summary of Financing Types
Average
($000)

Sum
($000)

Percent
(%)

Number o f
firms

Percentage by
number o f firms

Cash

1,566.9

960,525.1

81.54%

596

97.23%

Real Assets Investment

242.4

148,568.1

12.61%

123

20.07%

Land Possession Right

30.8

18,903.7

1.60%

8

1.31%

Financing Type

Technology Transfer
81.5
49,942.1
4.24%
48
7.83%
Note 1: some companies have multiple fmancing types.
Note 2: there are 66 companies with missing fmancing type information, and those companies are not included
in the Table.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics (# of observations=679)
Variable

Minimum

Mean

Median

Maximum

Std Dev

logrev

5.5370581

13.33124

13.3281873

21.22012

2.0457538

logcap

8.1963182

12.76654

12.5783448

19.30378

1.7323766

govfund

0

227154.1

0

17291415

1355376.6

colfund

0

26391.79

4232164

214510.48

entfund

0

745652.6

0
0

60459492

3893653.8

indfund

0
0
0

410632.6

60459.49

21172914

1419577.6

58097.28

15870617

698079.7

2.42E+08

9333264.5

0.0825
0.0545

dument

0
0
0

0
0
0

dumind
dumhmt

hmtfund
forfund
dumgov
dumcol

dumfor

473706

0.275
0.227

0.346

0
0

0

0.648

1

0.478

0
0
0

0.0412

0

0.199

0.133

0
0

0.339

0.476

0.4059298
0.207658
loss
Notes: logrev= log o f operating revenues; logcap=log o f capitals; govfund: amount o f fmancing from
government; colfund: amount o f fmancing from collective sources; entfimd: amount o f fmancing from legal
persons; indfund: amount o f financing from individuals; hmtfund: amount o f fmancing from Hong Kong, Macao
or Taiwan; forfimd: amount o f financing from foreign investments; dumgov: a dummy variable =1 if the firm
receives financing from government; dumcol: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives financing from collective
sources; dument: a durrmiy variable =1 if the firm receives financing from legal persons; dumind: a dummy
variable =1 if the firm receives financing from individuals; dumhmt: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives
financing from Hongkong, Macao or Taiwan; dumfor: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives financing from
foreign investors; loss: a dummy variable =1 if the firm incurs loss during the fiscal year.
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Table 7
Correlation Matrix
logrev_____ logcap

govfund

colfund

entfund

indfimd

hmtfimd

forfimd

logrev

1

0.5764

0.19262

0.08278

0.19747

0.16016

0.10579

0.0515

logcap

0.5764

1

0.2926

0.11922

0.38019

0.33404

0.14461

0.16384

govfund

0.19262

0.2926

1

0.17914

-0.00373

0.01693

-0.01388

-0.00783

colfimd

0.08278

0.11922

0.17914

1

-0.02261

-0.03361

-0.00958

-0.00594

entfimd

0.19747

0.38019

-0.00373

-0.02261

1

0.04445

0.07859

-0.00766

indfimd

0.16016

0.33404

0.01693

-0.03361

0.04445

1

-0.02062

-0.0147

hmtfimd

0.10579

0.14461

-0.01388

-0.00958

0.07859

-0.02062

1

-0.00419

-0.00419
1
-0.0147
-0.00766
-0.00594
0.16384
-0.00783
forfimd
0.0515
Notes: logrev= log o f operating revenues; logcap=log o f capitals; govfund: amount o f financing firom
government; colfund: amount o f financing from collective sources; entfund: amount o f financing from legal
persons; indfimd: amount o f financing from individuals; hmtfimd: amount o f financing from Hong Kong, Macao
or Taiwan; forfimd: amount o f financing from foreign investments;

Table 8
OLS Regression Results (# of observations=679)
Dependent variable = log of operating revenues
Variable

Estimate

t Value

Pr

Intercept

5.291

10.440

<.0001

Logcap

0.625

16.620

<.0001

Dumgov

0.415

1.620

0.107

Dumper

0.033

0.230

0.820

Dumind
Dumfor

-0.413

-2.360

0.019

1.025

4.130

<.0001

dumhmt

0.189

0.520

0.603

dum04
0.293
2.380
0.018
Note 1: logcap: log o f registered capital; dumgov: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives fmancing from
government; dumcol: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives fmancing from collective sources; dimient: a
dummy variable =1 if the firm receives fmancing from legal persons; dumind: a dummy variable =1 if the firm
receives financing from individuals; dumhmt: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives financing from
Hongkong, Macao or Taiwan; dumfor: a dummy variable =1 if the firm receives fmancing from foreign
investors; Dum04 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is in 2004.
Note 2: R-square=04, and adjusted R-square=0.395. F Value=64.12, which is significant at 0.001 level.
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Table 9
Logit Model Result
Dependent Variable: Loss (dummy variable =1 if the company incur loss)

Parameter

Estimate

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

4.0346

17.359

<.0001

logrev

-0.5917

66.9298

<.0001

logcap

0.1431

3.7345

0.0533

dnmgov

0.5501

1.5703

0.2102

dumper

0.2464

0.9998

0.3174

dumind

-0.00454

0.0002

0.9879

dumfor

1.2266

9.2088

0.0024

dumhmt

-1.5446

3.4641

0.0627

0.3933
dum04
3.505
0.0612
Note 1: logrev: log o f operating revenue; logcap: log o f registered capital. See Table 7 for definition for other
variables.
Note 2: likelihood ratio=100.3, which is statistically significant at 99% level.
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